The advances in wireless communication and positioning technology have made it possible to collect large volumes of personal location data.
Introduction
Today's technologies allow wireless service providers to identify fairly precise geographic location of their users. This capability makes it possible to comply with the federal E-911 regulations, but also enable the service provides to collect large volumes of personal location data. Such data reveal the patterns of city population dynamics and therefore can be used in many important applications, including transportation scheduling [11] , enterprise and urban planning [9] , and social interaction and community studies [16] , just to name a few.
While large collections of location data are of great values to a variety of organizations, making them public accessible is generally prohibited. A person's whereabouts may reveal sensitive private information. For instance, frequent visits to certain types of locations may be linked directly to one's health conditions, lifestyles, and political associations. In particular, unlike other personal data posted on the Internet, location information has the potential to allow an adversary to physically locate a user. As such, exposing such information presents significant privacy and security threats to individuals.
This paper investigates the challenges of publishing location data while preserving the anonymity of data subject. It may first appear that one can simply replace user IDs with randomly generated pseudonyms. However, using pseudonyms, or not using at all, is not sufficient for anonymity protection. This is due to fact that a user's location information itself can reveal her real-world identity. For instance, if a location belongs to a private address, then the subject is likely to be the owner of the address. It may be difficult to link an individual location sample to a subject, but the accumulation of a user's location data will eventually reveal her true identity. This has been confirmed in a number of experimental studies by different research groups (e.g., [2] , [8] ).
For anonymity protection, location data must be depersonalized before they can be published. The problem of location depersonalization has been investigated in a series of research work (e.g., [5] , [4] , [10] , [14] , [15] ) to support anonymous uses of location-based services (LBSs). The basic idea is to reduce location resolution to prevent service providers from deriving their users' true identity based on the location information they submitted in request of services. Specifically, when a client node requests an LBS, it reports its current position to an anonymity server; the server then computes a cloaking box that contains the client node and at least K − 1 other mobile nodes. This box is then reported as the client's location to request the LBS. Since any entity inside the cloaking box could be the one that requests the service, this strategy effectively provides K-anonymity protection to the service user.
The existing techniques falls short when applied for publishing large volumes of location data. They are all designed for anonymous uses of LBSs. Since a user's location needs to be cloaked only when it requests an LBS, these techniques depersonalize location samples one at a time individually. In the case of depersonalizing large volumes of location data, significant savings on disk I/O and CPU times can be achieved through batch processing. Therefore, new algorithms can be designed for efficient location data publishing, which to our knowledge has not been investigated in literature. In this paper, we present a novel cloaking algorithm that can depersonalize large sets of location data in batch. For each location sample, our algorithm is able to compute a minimal cloaking box given a user-defined anonymity requirement. Making a cloaking box as small as possible, without compromise of anonymity requirement, is critical to ensure that the published data remains informative and statistically usable. Our simulation shows that through batching processing, the disk I/O and CPU time can be reduced more than 50%, as compared to cloaking location samples one at a time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work in more detail. In Section 3, we present our system overview and goals, and then in Section 4, propose our cloaking algorithms. The performance of the proposed techniques is evaluated in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
Related Work
Location privacy has been a significant concern since early 1990s [7, 13, 1] . In the context of mobile cellular systems, the IETF Geolocation & Privacy Working Group [3] considers the privacy and security issues regarding the transfer of cell phone location information to external services. The group suggests using pseudonyms and has focused on protocol designs and APIs for mobile devices to communicate their location in a private and secure fashion. This work, however, assumes the receivers of location data are trusted.
The problem of location depersonalization was first studied by Gruteser and Grunwald [5] . As an extension of the traditional K-anonymity model [12] , they proposed to reduce the accuracy of a user's location information along spatial and/or temporal dimensions for a certain level of anonymity protection. Specifically, spatial cloaking is used to ensure that every location reported to a service provider is a cloaking area that contains at least K nodes. If the resolution of a location is too coarse for quality services, temporal cloaking is applied, i.e., delaying a user's service request. When more mobile nodes come near to the user, a smaller cloaking area can then be computed. This basic concept has inspired a series of research publications. In [4] , Gedik and Liu considered allowing users to specify their own value of K and minimizing the size of the cloaking areas, a factor critical for the quality of LBSs. The proposed algorithm, however, incurs high computation overhead and is appropriate only when the value of K is small. The techniques proposed in [10] and [6] , by Mokbel et al and Kalnis et al, respectively, also support customization of K, but do not minimize the size of cloaking areas. An important contribution of these two works is their consideration of query processing, i.e., how a location-dependent query can be processed with a location of reduced resolution. More recently, Xu and Cai proposed exploring historical location samples for location cloaking [15] . If a region has been visited by a lot of different people, then it is likely a public area and cannot be linked directly to some specific user. As such, as long as an area contains a sufficient number of different footprints, it can be used as a cloaking area. While this strategy significantly improves cloaking resolution for a given level anonymity requirement, it also makes possible to support anonymous uses of continuous LBSs, wherein users have to report their location frequently.
Despite the differences of these techniques in cloaking computation, they are all designed for anonymous uses of LBSs, and depersonalize users' locations one at a time when their requests arrive.
Location Data Publishing
We assume a large number of mobile users and their locations are sampled periodically. Each location sample is represented as a two-dimensional point. The location samples collected within one cycle are stored in a location table. For efficient retrieval of location in a given region, we assume a quadtree is used to index all location samples collected. Each user can specify a value of K (i.e., a desired level of anonymity protection), which can be included in a user's profile. Given a user's location (x, y) and the corresponding value of K, we want to identify a K-Anonymity Area (KAA), defined to be a circular region 1 that contains point (x, y) and at least K − 1 other users' location samples (which may be collected at different times). Thus, given a location table with n users' positions, we want to convert it into a new location table with n KAAs. The new table can then be released to general public.
To make published location data as useful as possible, each KAA should be as small as possible. For this pur-pose, we adopt the cloaking algorithm proposed in [14] , which can identify a minimal KAA for an individual location sample in a polynomial time. In the following subsections, we first explain this algorithm in detail and then extend it to compute KAAs in batch.
Single Location Sample Cloaking
Without causing ambiguity, we will use terms location sample and node interchangeably. Given a node N , we want to find its minimal KAA, i.e., the minimum bounding circle (MBC) that contains N and K − 1 other nodes. To facilitate our discussion, we use C min to denote this MBC, C a a bounding circle that contains N and at least K − 1 other nodes, and C b the circle centered at N with a radius that is two times of that of C a . Also, given a circle C, we denote its radius as C.R. These notations are illustrated in Figure 1 . The algorithm of searching C min is based on the observation that C min must be bounded by C b , which can be explained as follows. By its definition, C a contains K nodes including N . Since C a is a candidate of C min , C min must be no larger than C a , i.e., C min .R ≤ C a .R. Since both C min and C a contain N , the distance between any point in C min and N 's position must not be larger than 2 · C a .R. As a result, C min must be inside C b . To find C min , the cloaking algorithm first finds a C a with a small radius. Assuming location samples are indexed using a quadtree, this is done by finding the cell where N locates and marking this cell as the searching box. If the number of nodes inside the searching box is less than K, it expands the searching box by including its adjacent cells. This process is repeated until the searching box contains at least K nodes. Among these nodes, the algorithm finds K − 1 nodes that are nearest to N and set C a to be the MBC that bounds these K − 1 nodes and N .
This step costs O(K).
After locating a C a , the cloaking algorithm determines C b and retrieves all nodes inside C b . Let S be the set of these nodes and |S| the number of them. As the area of C b is 4 times of that of C a , the number of nodes inside C b is O(K). Given C b and the set of nodes inside it, we now construct the candidates for C min and then select the one that has the smallest radius as C min . Since C min is the minimum circle that contains N and at least K − 1 other nodes, there must have at least two nodes on the circle line of C min . Thus, C min 's candidates can be classified into two categories.
A candidate in the first category has exactly two nodes on its circle line. In this case, the two nodes must form a diameter of the candidate. Such candidates can be enumerated by considering all possible pairs of the nodes inside C b . Given a pair of nodes, the circle can be constructed with the two nodes as its diameter. The circle is a valid candidate if it contains N and at least K − 1 other nodes. Among all valid candidates, the one that has the smallest diameter is identified. Let this candidate be C. Given a set of nodes S, there are totally |S| 2 different pairs of nodes. Thus, the computational cost in this step is O(K 2 ). A candidate in the second category has at least three nodes on its circle line. Note that any three of nodes can form a triangle and in a two-dimension domain (as long as they are not on the same line), and a triangle can form only one circumscribed circle. Thus, all possible triple nodes in S can be enumerated. For each triple, the circumscribed circle formed by the three nodes can then be constructed. If the circle contains N and at least K − 1 other nodes, it is a valid candidate. Again, among all valid candidates, we find the one that is smallest. Let this candidate be C . Since the number of possible triples is |S| 3 , the computation cost in this step is O(K 3 ). Finally, C is compared with C , and the smaller one is C min . Since the total cost of the entire process is
, the above algorithm finds C min in a polynomial time.
Batch Location Sample Cloaking
Given a set of location samples, the above cloaking algorithm can be applied to depersonalize them one at a time. This process can be improved through batch processing. Specifically, in the process of finding a C min for a particular node N , we can also find C min for other nodes that are nearby. Let C a be a bounding circle that contains N and at least K − 1 other nodes, where K is N 's anonymity requirement, and C B the circle centered at N with a radius that is three times of that of C a . Let N be any node inside C a with an anonymity requirement K , where K ≤ K, and C min be its minimum KAA. These notations are illustrated in Figure 2 . We have the following observation:
Proof. By its definition, C a contains K nodes including N and is therefore a candidate of C min . As N is inside C min , its distance to any point in C min must not be larger than 2 · C a .R. Since the largest distance between N and N is C a .R, the distance between N and any point in C min must not be larger than 3 · C a .R. Thus, C min must be inside C B . Thus, once we determine C a for a particular node, we can find C min for all nodes inside C a with an anonymity requirement no larger than K. We will refer to these nodes as batching nodes hereafter. However, the search scope now increases to C B (with a radius of 3 · C a .R), as compared to C b (with a radius of 2·C a .R) if we find C min for each node one by one. Whether or not we should apply batching processing depends on if there is a sufficient number of batching nodes. Suppose there are n nodes inside C a and the number of batching nodes is n b . Assuming nodes are uniformly distributed, the number of nodes inside C b and C B can then be estimated as 4n and 9n, respectively. If we cloak each batching node one by one, the total number of C min candidates we need to construct is n b · ( , then batching processing can be applied to improve performance.
Based on the above observation and analysis, we now present a batch cloaking algorithm. Suppose we allocate a buffer B in the main memory to hold the location samples to be cloaked, we have the following algorithms. 4. Let n be the number of nodes inside C a (these nodes are all batching nodes since their anonymity requirement must be no larger than K);
, then do single cloaking as follows:
• Load all nodes inside C b ;
• Construct all C min candidates;
• Set C min to be the one with the smallest radius that contains N and at least K − 1 other nodes;
• Output N and its C min ;
• Remove N from B.
6. Otherwise, do batch cloaking as follows:
• Load all nodes inside C B ;
• Construct all possible circles with these nodes (remove one immediately if its radius is larger than C a );
• For each node inside C a , find its C min from the candidates constructed above;
• Output all these nodes and their corresponding C min ;
• Remove all these nodes from B.
7. Fill B with the remaining nodes on the disk and repeat the above process until all nodes are depersonalized.
Performance Study
We have implemented the proposed techniques and evaluated their performance with simulated collections of location samples, each having its own anonymity requirement K. Given a set of location samples, we index them using a quadtree. Each internal node of the tree has pointers linking its four child nodes, and each external (leaf) node is a fixed size of buffer that occupies one disk page. For each set of location samples, we depersonalize them using two approaches, single and batch. The formal depersonalize location samples one at a time while the later does so in batch. We choose two performance metrics:
• CPU cost: Given a set of location samples, we record the total CPU time used by each technique to depersonalize them all, and report this time as a technique's CPU cost. • Disk I/O cost: Given a large set of location samples, it may not be loaded entirely into the main memory for processing. In this case, disk I/O is the performance bottleneck, and cache replacement policies has a significant impact on the total time spent in depersonalization. To avoid assuming some specific cache replacement policy, we count the number of different leaf nodes accessed in processing each location sample, and use this as the estimation of disk I/O cost.
Our first study investigates how the performance of the two techniques is affected by the number of location samples. In this study, we generated a number of different sets of location samples, ranging from 10,000 to 100,000. The level of anonymity requirement K of these location samples range from 5 to 20 with an average of 10. The size of disk page (quadtree leaf node) is set to be 4K bytes. We run both single and batch approaches on these sets of location samples and plot their performance results in 3. As the number of location samples increases, both batch and single take more CPU time and disk I/O cost to complete depersonalization. However, batch outperforms single about 50% in all settings, showing the significant advantage of depersonalizing location samples as many as possible in one iteration.
Our first study investigates how the performance of the two techniques is affected by the level of anonymity requirement. In this study, we generate 50,000 location samples, but varied their average anonymity requirement K from 5 to 20. The size of quad-tree leaf node is again fixed at 4KB. The performance results of both single and batch are illustrated in Figure 4 . For CPU cost, when the value of K is small (from 5 to 10), the performance of the two techniques is about the same, but as K increases (after 10), their performance gap increases. This is due to the fact that when K is smaller, the number of batching nodes include in C a is less. When this number is not sufficient, there is actually no batch processing. When the number of K becomes larger, there is more chance for batch processing, which in turn significantly improves the overall system performance. As for disk I/O, it appears that as K increases, the number of Disk I/O for batch processing actually decreases. This can be explained as follows. When K increases, there are more nodes in each batch and hence the number of iterations required to process all the location samples reduces. In our simulation, the quadtree nodes fetched in each iteration are reused, thus the average number of different quadtree nodes loaded for each location sample decreases. This study indicates that batch processing can perform much better when there is sufficient memory allocated depersonalization. In reality, users tend to choose a larger value of K for their privacy protection, making batch processing highly desirable.
Concluding Remarks
Large collections of personal location data are of great values to many organizations, yet making such data accessible to general public would present significant privacy and security threats to individuals. Simply removing the identity of data subject is not sufficient for anonymity protection, since location information itself may reveal a subject's real-world identity. Therefore, location data must be depersonalized before they can be published. Existing research investigates the problem of location depersonalization in the context of supporting anonymous uses of location-based services, and the proposed techniques depersonalize location samples one at a time. In this paper, we present a new algorithm that can depersonalize loca- tion samples in batch. Our performance study shows that by processing many location samples in one iteration, the new scheme can significantly reduce the CPU cost and the number of disk I/O, making it highly efficient in publishing large volumes of location data.
